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IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S US: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION 
OF TRADEMARK GOODWILL TO PROPERLY BALANCE 
THE RESULTS OF TRADEMARK LICENSE REJECTION 
ABSTRACT 
In 1988, Congress amended § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the 
rejection of executory contracts to allow intellectual property licensees to retain 
usage rights following rejection. This addition, however, did not include 
trademarks in its definition of intellectual properties. For this reason, the Circuit 
Courts are currently split as to the proper treatment of the rejection of 
trademark licenses in bankruptcy. The split has intensified in recent years, with 
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, decided in the First Circuit 
in January of 2018, directly criticizing the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision in 
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing. Both sides of the 
split, however, fail to take full account of the unique aspects of trademark law 
necessary in order to achieve the most equitable solution for all parties. 
This Comment argues that, in absence of guidance from Congress and to 
create the most equitable solution, courts should place paramount concern in 
protecting the value of licensed trademarks. In doing so, courts should consider 
the aspects of trademarks that make them distinct from the other intellectual 
properties: their reflection of the expectations and goodwill of the public. With 
this relationship in mind, I propose a three-factor test to help courts assess 
whether favoring a licensor or licensee of a trademark would create the most 
equitable result for both the estate and the public at large.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine if tomorrow morning, McDonald’s filed for bankruptcy.1 What 
would happen to its thousands of franchisees? These men and women built their 
businesses around those Big Macs®,2 Chicken McNuggets®,3 and 
McFlurries®.4 Would they be left without the branding they depend upon as 
McDonald’s reorganized, hoping to reacquire and rehabilitate its own brand? 
After all, one of McDonald’s biggest assets is the power of that brand. Could 
restructuring even be possible with its franchisees’ continued usage of its 
trademarks, diluting the brand that it needs to come out of Chapter 11 alive? 
Where would the courts come down in this struggle over the usage of licensed 
trademarks? 
While McDonald’s is unlikely to send its golden arches to the bankruptcy 
court any time soon, smaller scale versions of trademark licensing rejection do 
happen, and the Bankruptcy Code5 as currently written by Congress is inapt to 
deal with them.6 Without congressional guidance, courts have taken it upon 
themselves to find the most equitable solution.7 In so doing, various Circuit 
Courts have split,8 leaving the prospect of how exactly any given license will be 
dealt with by bankruptcy courts in flux.9 This leaves no guarantee from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction how a license will fare post-rejection, let alone 
whether the treatment will be the most equitable result for all parties. 
In 1988, Congress amended the portion of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with 
the rejection of executory contracts to allow intellectual property licensees to 
retain usage rights following rejection.10 This addition, however, did not include 
 
 1 Perhaps all-day breakfast turned out not to be the godsend it first appeared to be. 
 2 BIG MAC, Registration No. 1331342. 
 3 CHICKEN MCNUGGETS, Registration No. 1548683. 
 4 MCFLURRY, Registration No. 2805110; Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 
198, 221 (D. Md. 1988) (ruling in favor of McDonald’s, finding that adding the prefix “Mc” to a generic word 
had acquired a secondary meaning, thus making the very act a trademark of McDonald’s). 
 5 11 U.S.C §§ 101 et. seq (2016). 
 6 See Jeffrey D. Osterman & Debra A. Dandeneau, Bankruptcy and Modern Technology Transactions: 
An Old Bottle for New Wine, 25 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 181 (2016). 
 7 See, e.g., Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chi. American Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2012); In 
re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 512 (Bankr. Del. 2003). 
 8 Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st 
Cir. 2018); Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st 
Cir. 2018), petition for cert. granted (Oct. 26, 2018) (No. 17-1657). 
 9 See Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6.  
 10 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2016).  
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trademarks in its definition of intellectual properties.11 This was for good reason. 
Trademarks hold a unique place among the various forms of intellectual 
property. Unlike patents or copyrights, which spring from the minds of their 
creators to a place of value in the world, trademarks live within the relationship 
between a business and its customers.12 This relationship is muddled when, as 
in the case of franchising, the owner of the trademark and the purveyor of a 
business are not the same legal entity. The relationship is complicated further 
when the licensor of a trademark goes into bankruptcy and attempts to reject the 
trademark license under the Bankruptcy Code. 
Both sides of a trademark license face difficulties in the course of 
bankruptcy. Licensors attempt to use bankruptcy to regain complete control over 
the rights to their trademarks in order to rebuild their assets to pay off their debts 
and move forward once again. Licensees attempt to hold on to rights to use the 
licensor’s mark that they often have built their current businesses around. And 
Congress, first through omission and then through inaction, has failed to provide 
the legislative guidance to help judges sort through these complications.  
Without definitive congressional word, courts have split on the proper tack 
as to the rejection of trademark licensing agreements.13 One side takes the firm 
line that trademark licenses receive no special treatment beyond that of any other 
executory contract.14 The other treats trademark licenses more in line with those 
of other intellectual properties.15 This places uncertainty on trademark licenses 
throughout the nation, uncertainty that limits the value of licenses for companies 
in and out of the bankruptcy system.16 All the while, the question remains as to 
which approach, if either, is most equitable.17 
This Comment argues that, in absence of guidance from Congress and in 
order to create the most equitable solution, courts should place paramount 
concern in protecting the value of licensed trademarks. In doing so, courts should 
consider the aspect of trademarks that makes them distinct from the other 
intellectual properties: their reflection of the expectations and goodwill of the 
public. With this relationship in mind, courts should ensure that the entity which 
 
 11 James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, Trademark Licensing in the Shadow of Bankruptcy, 68 BUS. 
L. 739, 754 (2013). 
 12 See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (5th ed. 2017). 
 13 See Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6, at 198. 
 14 See In re Tempnology, LLC, 878 F.3d at 401.  
 15 See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chi. American Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 16 In re Tempnology, LLC, 878 F.3d at 404; Amicus Curiae Brief at 3, 5, Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. 
Tempnology, LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 878 F.3d 389, 401 (1st Cir. 2018)(No. 17-1657). 
 17 Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6, at 193–94. 
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has most contributed to the value of the relationship between consumers and 
brand may continue to use the marks in question. By doing so, courts will not 
only do justice in the dispute between licensor and licensee but also protect 
consumers as trademark law is designed to do. 
Section I of this Comment discusses the key elements of bankruptcy, 
executory contract law, and trademark law necessary to a full understanding of 
the issue. Section II analyzes the circuit split that currently exists over the proper 
interpretation of the treatment of trademarks under § 365 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.18 Section III assesses the issues raised by both sides of the split, before 
introducing a factor test designed to aid courts in analyzing individual cases in 
a way which is neither overly rigid nor cavalierly vague toward trademark rights. 
I. BACKGROUND LEGAL CONCEPTS 
Three areas of law govern the treatment of the rejection of trademark 
licensing agreements: the Bankruptcy Code, executory contract law, and 
trademark law. Each offers insight as to how individual trademark license cases 
should be handled. First, the purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code offers an 
overarching guide for what kinds of results courts should seek to create.19 Next, 
executory contract law defines the kind of relationship trademark licensors and 
licensees have, within which the goals of bankruptcy can be fostered.20 Finally, 
trademark law is essential to understand the unique form of property at the center 
of these disputes in order to come to the most equitable result for both the parties 
and society as a whole. 
A. The Goals of Bankruptcy 
Congress established the Bankruptcy Code to further two primary goals: to 
provide the debtor with a fresh start and to maximize the repayment of 
creditors.21 For businesses, this is ideally served by reorganization.22 The 
Supreme Court has emphasized the value of reorganization to the debtor’s fresh 
start, noting that the “fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a 
debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible 
 
 18 The portion of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the rejection of executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365 
(2016).  
 19 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (16th 2017). 
 20 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02 (16th 2017). 
 21 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01 (16th 2017). 
 22 Id. 
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misuse of economic resources.”23 Meanwhile the Bankruptcy Code mandates 
that any such reorganization also pay creditors at least as much as liquidation, 
ensuring that both goals are met.24 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code creates a system 
in which the debtor, creditors, and society at large have an interest in 
restructuring the legal and financial realities of the estate to maximize value. 
B. The Role of § 365 in the Bankruptcy Code 
In order to best maximize the value of the estate, the debtor in possession 
may be forced to breach contracts that, at the time of bankruptcy, are 
economically inefficient.25 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the 
debtor in possession of an estate in bankruptcy to reject or assume executory 
contracts, with the goal of allowing the assumption of the most valuable 
contracts as assets and the removal of the most burdensome.26 The traditional 
standard used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a debtor in possession 
has acted properly in rejecting an executory contract is the “business judgment” 
rule which holds that a “debtor’s business judgment should not be interfered 
with, absent a showing of bad faith or abuse of business discretion.”27  
Section 365 deals with executory contracts within bankruptcy; however, the 
statute itself does not define the term “executory contract.”28 The standard 
definition of an executory contract follows the Countryman test,29 which states 
that executory contracts are “contracts on which performance remains due to 
some extent on both sides” provided that non-performance of the duties of either 
 
 23 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). 
 24 COLLIER, supra note 27; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2016), 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (2016), 11 
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2016).  
 25 COLLIER, supra note 28. 
 26 ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKR. § 7.01 
(5th ed. 2016). 
 27 In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 430–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also NLRB v. Bildisco & 
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984). 
 28 COLLIER, supra note 28. 
 29 The Countryman test was originally stated in a 1973 law review article by Harvard Law Professor Vern 
Countryman, who wrote that a “contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to 
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material 
breach excusing performance of the other.” Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 446 (1973). This test has been looked upon favorably when interpreting the Bankruptcy Code by both 
Congress and circuit courts. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. 1, at 6051-52 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-989, pt.1, at 56 
(1978); Lewis Bros. Bakeries v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp.), 751 F.3d 955, 962 (8th 
Cir. 2014); In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010); Regen Capital I, Inc. v. Halperin (In 
re U.S. Wireless Data, Inc.), 547 F.3d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 2008); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l Fibercom, Inc. (In 
re Int’l Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2007); In re Spoverlook, LLC, 551 B.R. 481, 484 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. 2016); see generally COLLIER, supra note 28. 
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party would result in a material breach of the contract.30 For instance, a typical 
residential real estate lease agreement is executory, as the landlord has an 
obligation to allow residence and maintain a certain standard of repair, the renter 
has an obligation to pay rent, and failure of either party to perform results in a 
breach of the contract. Courts have applied the test in such a way as to hold that 
if one party has substantially performed its obligations, the contract is no longer 
executory.31 
When a contract is rejected, § 365(g) provides that “rejection of an executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract.”32 
While courts are split as to what extent this breach alters the contract,33 the most 
common interpretation is that rejection of an executory contract allows the 
rejected party to receive monetary damages from the debtor’s breach, which 
transforms the rejected licensee into an unsecured creditor of the estate.34 
Monetary damages are the default form of relief, but other forms are available 
for certain circumstances provided for within § 365.35 Notably, Congress added 
a separate provision for the treatment of intellectual property licenses. 
In 1988, § 365(n) was added to allow an intellectual property licensee to 
continue to use intellectual property under a prepetition license even after the 
debtor in possession has rejected the license “to the extent of the licensee’s use 
of the property existing immediately before the bankruptcy case commenced.”36 
Section 365(n) was established in the wake of the Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. decision,37 which held that licensees of 
intellectual property could not retain use of the intellectual property once the 
licensing contract was rejected. This created an inherent instability for the 
licensing of patents and copyrights and risked a drastic reduction in the practice 
of licensing intellectual property.38 To avoid this uncertainty, Congress sought 
“to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the 
 
 30 COLLIER, supra note 28 (citing Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973)). 
 31 COLLIER, supra note 28; see, e.g., In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 963 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2016).  
 33 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.10 (16th ed. 2017). 
 34 Id. (Estimation of claims arising from breached contracts are covered under § 502(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code). 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(2) (2016). 
 35 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 365(h),(i),(n) (2016).  
 36 ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN KELLEY, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKR. § 7.04 
(5th ed. 2016). 
 37 This case will be discussed in full in the next section of this Comment. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 38 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 307 
(1989). 
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licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of the 
license pursuant to Section 365 in the event of the licensor’s bankruptcy.”39 
To this end, upon a debtor-licensor’s rejection of an intellectual property 
license, § 365(n) offers a choice to the licensee: treat the rejection as a breach 
and termination of the license,40 or retain the rights granted by the license, 
including that of exclusivity, for the duration of the contract including any 
extensions allowed under the contract and applicable non-bankruptcy law.41  
While § 365(n) explicitly overturned Lubrizol legislatively for most 
intellectual properties, the definition of intellectual property added to the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1988 did not include trademarks.42 Explaining the omission, 
Congress noted that despite the applicability of Lubrizol to all types of 
intellectual property, including trademarks under the provision would “raise 
issues beyond the scope of this legislation” because “trademark, trade name and 
service mark licensing relationships depend to a large extent on control of the 
quality of the products or services sold by the licensee.”43 The distinct problems 
which could arise from this relationship “could not be addressed without more 
extensive study” and thus Congress decided “to postpone congressional action 
in this area and to allow the development of equitable treatment of this situation 
by bankruptcy courts.”44 Courts have since grappled with the open question of 
how and when, if ever, to treat trademarks in the same manner as § 365(n) 
dictates for other intellectual properties. 
C. Essential Aspects of Trademark Law 
When Congress added intellectual property to § 365, it opted not to include 
trademarks in the definition of intellectual property under § 101(35A) largely 
due to the unique nature of trademarks as property.45 Unlike copyright and patent 
law, which are derived from Article I of the Constitution,46 trademark 
protections developed from state civil consumer protection law before being 
 
 39 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3200.  
 40 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A) (2016).  
 41 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2016).  
 42 For the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, “intellectual property” includes: “trade secret,” “invention, 
process, design, or plant protected under title 35 [Patents],” “patent application,” “plant variety,” “work of 
authorship protected under title 17 [Copyrights],” and “mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17 
[Copyrights of Semiconductor Chip Products].” 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2016). See also 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2016); 
17 U.S.C. § 101(4) (2016); 17 U.S.C. § 901(9)(b) (2016). 
 43 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.  
 44 Id.  
 45 See id. 
 46 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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federally codified under the Lanham Act in 1946, pursuant to Congress’ 
commerce clause power.47 Thus, trademark law consists of both the Lanham Act 
and state trademark and consumer protection laws.48 
The aspects of the law that separate trademarks from the other intellectual 
properties, the way trademark licenses operate and the risk of abandonment that 
can arise under a trademark license, each in turn affect the way trademark 
licenses are handled under § 365. 
1. Unique Aspects of Trademark Law Within the Context of Intellectual 
Property 
A trademark is a form of intellectual property that indicates the source or 
origin of a product or service so as to distinguish it from the products or services 
of others.49 This source-identification function has value for both the public at 
large and the owner of the mark.50 For the consuming public, the mark represents 
a known standard of quality from a trusted source which allows a consumer to 
make an informed decision as to which goods or services to purchase.51 For the 
mark’s owner, that standard of quality represents a valuable connection between 
the owner’s business and clientele and can in turn be used to market the owner’s 
product.52 These dual aspects of protection are represented in the two primary 
goals of trademark law: to prevent the consumer from being confused as to the 
origin of a good or service, and to protect the property interests of the trademark 
holder in the value of its mark.53 
Because trademarks are rooted in the relationship between the mark and the 
consuming public, trademark protections are distinct from other intellectual 
properties.54 Broadly speaking, patent and copyright protections balance the 
rights of a creator to profit from a discrete innovation or work and the interests 
of the public to have greater access to this creative output; this balance is 
achieved by granting the holder of a patent or copyright a temporary right to 
 
 47 15 U.S.C. § 1051(26) (2016); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.04 
(2017). 
 48 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.04 (2017). 
 49 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2017). 
 50 See generally 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2017). 
 51 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03 (2017). 
 52 Id. 
 53 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (5th ed. 2017). 
 54 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (5th ed. 2017). 
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exclude others from using the creative work or invention.55 The creator is given 
time to recoup the expense of creation as well as profit, before the innovation 
enters into the public domain at which point any entity is free to use it. A 
trademark, on the other hand, is not an innovation but instead an identifier of 
source and quality; as such, there is detriment, not value, to the public in 
allowing a trademark to be used by all.56 For this reason, trademarks are valid 
and protectable for a potentially unlimited length of time, provided that the mark 
is in use, is seen as a non-generic source identifier of the owner of the mark, and 
control is maintained over the quality of goods offered under the mark.57  
2. Trademarks in Licensing Agreements 
The inseparable tie of a mark to its owner makes trademark licensing distinct 
from other intellectual property licensing. Whether licensing an invention under 
a patent license or a creative work under a copyright license, the ability to use 
something akin to a tangible item of property (e.g., a drug or a song) is being 
leased to the licensee. A trademark license, on the other hand, leases the ability 
of a third party to trade on the goodwill accumulated under the trademark 
owner’s name, a significantly more amorphous concept which accordingly 
requires a special set of rules.58 
Under the Lanham Act59 trademark licenses are valid if “the licensor 
maintains adequate control over the nature and quality of goods and services 
sold under the mark by the licensee.”60 These licenses can be either exclusive or 
non-exclusive,61 and can also be limited to a certain geographical area.62 
One important subset of trademark licenses is the franchising agreement.63 
In addition to the right to use a mark that is standard across all trademark 
licenses, the licensor may add a variety of services and requirements, such as 
training and real estate leases.64 These kinds of agreements generally involve a 
much more aggressive amount of quality control compared to other trademark 
 
 55 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.05 (2017). For patents, this temporary monopoly generally lasts for 
twenty years, while copyrights can last up to seventy years after the death of their creators.  
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.03 (2017). 
 59 The Federal act which creates and governs trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et. seq. 
 60 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:42 (5th ed. 2017). 
 61 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.03 (2017). 
 62 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.07 (2017). 
 63 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.05 (2017). 
 64 Id. 
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licenses, with the franchisor dictating nearly all aspects of a franchisee’s 
business.65  
However, in all kinds of trademark licensing agreements, there is a duty of 
the licensor to ensure a certain level of consistency from its licensees.66 Failure 
to maintain this level of control may constitute naked licensing, which in turn 
can result in the abandonment of the mark.67 In light of this need for a reciprocal 
quality control relationship between licensor and licensee, Congress omitted 
trademarks from § 101(35A)68 pending further study of the effects of assumption 
or rejection.69 
3. Abandonment 
Because trademarks function as identifiers of source and quality, if, by an 
act of commission or omission by the owner or approbation by the public, the 
mark loses its significance as an indication of origin or standard of quality, then 
the mark may be deemed abandoned and may in turn no longer warrant 
protection.70 A commonly known way this happens is the process of genericide, 
in which a trademark becomes a generic term for a product or service.71 Because 
a trademarked name like “aspirin” or “escalator” has entered into popular use to 
such a great extent that it is synonymous in the mind of the public with a kind 
of good or service, not a specific brand of origin, it no longer serves the purpose 
for which trademarks exist and is thus not legally protectable.72 Another way 
trademarks may be abandoned is through the intentional non-use of a mark over 
an extended period of time.73 
 
 65 Id. 
 66 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.04 (2017). 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). 
 68 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2018). 
 69 S. REP. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204. 
 70 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:5 (5th ed. 2017). 
 71 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:8 (5th ed. 2017); see, e.g., Filipino 
Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1149–52 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the term 
“Yellow Pages” was deemed a generic term for a commercial phone book); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior 
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989)(finding the term “Murphy bed” was deemed a generic term for 
bed frame that folds out from a wall); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir. 
1936)(finding “cellophane” was deemed a generic term for transparent wrapping sheets made from cellulose); 
Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 304-306 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding “Pilates” was 
deemed a generic term for a type of aerobic exercise program); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 514-
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding “aspirin” was deemed a generic term for the compound acetylsalicylic acid). 
 72 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.05 (2017). 
 73 Id. When assessing whether the trademark owner has an intent not to use a trademark again in 
commerce, the Lanham Act mandates that courts see a mark as abandoned “when its use has been discontinued 
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In the context of licensing, a trademark can be abandoned through the 
process of naked licensing, which occurs when a trademark licensor fails to 
maintain adequate control over a licensee’s use of the trademark.74 Unlike 
genericide, through which a trademark comes to no longer convey a specific 
source, naked licensing causes a mark to lose its significance because the mark 
no longer conveys a consistent standard of quality.75 This failure to maintain 
quality among licensees leads to an increased likelihood that consumers, seeking 
the quality they have come to expect from goods branded with the trademark, 
will be deceived into purchasing sub-standard goods.76 
Because failure of a trademark owner to control the quality of licensed goods 
produced under its marks carries a high likelihood of consumer deception, courts 
have ruled that naked licensing can cause a mark to lose its inherent 
distinctiveness and thus its protection.77 Courts generally treat the inclusion of 
quality control measures in the licensing agreements as sufficient protection to 
stave off rulings of naked licensing.78 While naked licensing is not listed directly 
in the Lanham Act, the Act does provide that a mark is abandoned if an owner’s 
action or inaction caused the mark to “lose its significance as a mark.”79 This is 
notable because even though consumers still associate the mark with its owner, 
“the courts have traditionally treated an erosion of the designation’s capacity for 
accurate identification resulting from uncontrolled licensing as a loss of 
trademark significance,” potentially leading to abandonment.80  
A recent example of naked licensing is Eva’s Bridal, Ltd. v. Halanick 
Enterprises.81 The plaintiffs in that case had licensed the name “Eva’s Bridal” 
for bridal boutiques to various relatives at several locations throughout the 
greater Chicago area.82 Eventually they licensed their trademark to their 
 
with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for three 
consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 74 GILSON, supra note 66.  
 75 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:48 (5th ed. 2017). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.; see FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding naked 
licensing is ‘inherently deceptive’ and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the licensor.’”) 
(emphasis in original), Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“The 
Lanham Act clearly carries forward the view of these latter cases that controlled licensing does not work an 
abandonment of the licensor’s registration, while a system of naked licensing does.”). 
 78 GILSON, supra note 66. 
 79 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). 
 80 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 33, cmt. b (1995).  
 81 Eva’s Bridal, Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., 639 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 82 Id. at 789.  
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daughter’s brother-in-law under a licensing agreement that expired in 2002.83 
After the license expired, the defendant continued to use the trademarks while 
neither paying a royalty nor having a licensing agreement.84 When the plaintiffs 
sued the defendant for lack of royalty payment, five years later, the judge 
dismissed their claim, holding that the plaintiffs had engaged in naked licensing 
and thus could no longer protect their mark.85  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that this ruling was correct, for at no 
point, either during the original licensing agreement nor during the period of 
time following its expiration, did the licensors maintain a form of quality control 
over the franchises.86 The licensors argued that because bridal gowns are such 
high-ticket items, and because the former licensee got its gowns from the same 
designers as the licensor, a high level of quality was guaranteed.87 The court 
responded that this insistence on “‘high quality’ . . . misunderstands what 
judicial decisions . . . mean when they speak about ‘quality.’”88 Quality need not 
mean that a product is excellent, but instead that it is consistent from location to 
location.89 The court drew an analogy to various fast food restaurants: “though 
neither [Kentucky Fried Chicken] nor any other fast-food franchise receives a 
star . . . in the Guide Michelin . . . [a] person who visits one Kentucky Fried 
Chicken outlet finds that it has much the same ambiance and menu as any 
other.”90 Thus, because the licensor made no provision to ensure that customers 
could expect the same experience from one Eva’s Bridal to another, the license 
was naked and the trademark unenforceable.91 
Naked licensing poses a threat to the ability of a trademark owner to protect 
use of a trademark. This is tantamount to losing the vast majority of the value of 
the mark itself. The potentially perpetual life span of a mark makes the possible 
risk posed to loss of trademark through lack of control and loss of goodwill all 
the greater. Congress clearly considered these distinctions when electing not to 
include trademarks within the purview of § 365 in 1988. 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 789-90. 
 86 Id. at 791. 
 87 Id. at 790. 
 88 Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 33 (3rd 1995)); see also Kentucky Fried 
Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 89 Eva’s Bridal, Ltd., at 790. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 791. 
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II. CURRENT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF § 365 
Most circuits hold that, because the intellectual property definition under the 
Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks, courts should treat trademark 
licenses not as specially protected intellectual property, but instead as ordinary 
contracts.92 These courts take Congress’ decision not to include trademarks 
within the statute as a statement from Congress that it did not intend trademarks 
to receive special protection.93 With the influential decision In re Exide 
Technologies, however, the Third Circuit signaled a desire to reconsider this 
interpretation, noting in its concurrence the inequity of taking away licensees’ 
ability to use licensed marks.94 Since that decision, the notion that trademark 
licensees may retain trademark usage rights is the standing precedent in the 
Seventh Circuit,95 has been used by lower courts in the Third Circuit,96 and was 
recently used by the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel before being 
reversed by the First Circuit.97 
A. The Majority of Circuits Use Negative Inference to Determine that 
Trademark Rights Are Not Retained by Rejected Licensees 
Following Congress’ adoption of § 365(n), courts inferred the omission of 
trademarks from the statutory text to mean that Congress did not want trademark 
licensees to receive the same protections as those of other intellectual 
properties.98 Because Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to overturn 
Lubrizol, but did not include trademarks, then Lubrizol was presumed to be 
Congress’ intent for trademark licenses.99 Lubrizol, then, is essential to 
understanding the reasoning of the courts which use this interpretation. This 
section also includes an example of a more recent decision which uses the 
Lubrizol precedent to determine the rights of a trademark licensee following 
rejection of the licensing agreement. 
 
 92 See In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997); Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043; In re Old 
Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 
(Bankr. Del. 2003); In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 670–73 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); In re 
Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 429–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 93 See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513. 
 94 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957. 
 95 Sunbeam Products, Inc., LLC, 686 F.3d 372. 
 96 In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. 766, 772–74 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014). 
 97 Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 2018); In re 
Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. 809 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016), rev’d, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).  
 98 See Osterman & Dandeneau, supra note 6, at 198. 
 99 See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513. 
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1. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.100 
The seminal case which governs the treatment of intellectual property 
licenses under § 365 is Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 
Inc., which held that intellectual property licenses are generally executory and 
that rejection of those licenses allows only monetary damages for breach as 
compensation to the rejected licensee.101 Lubrizol centered on a contract 
between Richmond Metal Finishers (hereinafter “RMF”) and Lubrizol 
Enterprises giving Lubrizol nonexclusive rights to various intellectual properties 
owned by RMF.102 When RMF entered into chapter 11, it sought to reject this 
license under § 365.103 While the bankruptcy court allowed this action, finding 
that the contract was executory and the rejection was done in good faith, the 
district court reversed this decision on both counts.104 The Fourth Circuit 
subsequently reversed the decision of the district court.105 
While it is important that the court found the contracts executory,106 the true 
significance of the Lubrizol decision is its holding on what happens when an 
intellectual property license is rejected under § 365. Ruling the rejection of the 
contract legally justified, the court declared that Lubrizol “could not seek to 
retain its contract rights” and that “the statutory ‘breach’ contemplated 
by § 365(g) controls, and provides only a money damages remedy for the non-
bankrupt party.”107 This interpretation of § 365(g) relied on legislative history, 
which “makes clear that the purpose of the provision is to provide only a 
damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party.”108 Thus, because the Bankruptcy 
Code made no special provisions for retaining contractual rights following 
rejection, rejected intellectual property licenses could only seek monetary 
damages for breach.109 
 
 100 Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043. 
 101 Id. at 1048. 
 102 Id. at 1045. 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.  
 105 Id. at 1048. 
 106 Id. at 1045 (“Applying [the Countryman] test here, we conclude that the licensing agreement was at 
the critical time executory. RMF owed Lubrizol the continuing duties of notifying Lubrizol of further licensing 
of the process and of reducing Lubrizol’s royalty rate to meet any more favorable rates granted to subsequent 
licensees.”). 
 107 Id. at 1048. 
 108 Id. at 1045 (citing H. REP NO. 95- 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 349, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Ad. News 5963, 6305). 
 109 Id. at 1048. 
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2. In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc.110 
While Lubrizol dealt with intellectual property generally, and did not discuss 
trademarks at all, its treatment of executory contracts for intellectual property 
licenses formed the basis for § 365(n)111 and subsequent litigation.112 As the 
newly passed exception to § 365 did not mention trademarks, the reasoning of 
Lubrizol remained the standard approach for courts handling the rejection of 
trademark licenses.113 These courts reasoned that because Congress had the 
opportunity to provide a new approach to trademark licenses under § 365(n), but 
chose not to, then through negative inference the courts could assume Congress 
thought Lubrizol the correct approach to trademarks.114  
A representative example of the negative inference precedent is the 
Delaware Bankruptcy Court’s decision in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc.115 The 
debtors in this case leased office space, along with amenities such as telephone 
lines, videoconferencing, and reception, to other businesses; in addition, the 
debtors leased their trade and service marks to franchisees who in turn offered 
the same services in return for royalty fees.116 As part of the agreement, the 
debtors would not operate under their own marks in any region in which they 
could compete directly with a franchisee.117 Upon entering bankruptcy, the 
debtors rejected the franchising contracts, and the franchisees objected.118 
The court began its analysis by determining whether the contract in question 
was executory.119 Because the franchisees had an ongoing obligation to pay 
royalties and the debtors were required to forebear entering into a franchisee’s 
territory, the court ruled that both parties had sufficient remaining obligations 
within the contract to deem it executory.120 Next, the court looked to whether 
 
 110 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507. 
 111 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018). Passed in 1988, largely in response to the Lubrizol decision; see 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02. 
 112 In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. at 190 (finding claims to trademark rights claims are dismissed under 
§ 365 due to the non-inclusion of trademarks under the definition of intellectual property); In re HQ Global 
Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513; In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. at 663 (noting that the plain text of the 
statute excludes trademark); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. at 431 (“by rejecting the two licenses the debtor will 
deprive Farmland of its right to use the ‘Chipwich’ trademark for its products”). 
 113 See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. at 190; In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513; In re 
Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. at 663. 
 114 See, e.g., In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513. 
 115 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507. 
 116 Id. at 509. 
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 510. 
 120 Id. at 510–11. 
SMITH COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:25 AM 
282 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
the debtors were acting in good faith by rejecting the contracts.121 Applying the 
business judgment standard, the court found that the debtors’ ability to retain 
their own trademarks without territorial limitation held sufficient value for the 
estate as to warrant rejection.122 Having approved the rejection of the contracts 
under § 365, the court then sought to determine whether the licensees could 
retain use of the debtors’ marks.123 
This post-rejection rights analysis began with a note that § 365 leaves the 
rejected party with merely the right to claim damages for breach of contract, 
barring additional protections elsewhere in the section.124 The court noted while 
§ 365(n) provides additional protection for intellectual property, § 101(35A) 
does not mention trademarks within the definition of intellectual property.125 
Because Congress could have included trademarks, but chose not to, the court 
negatively inferred the franchisees to have no special privileges under the 
Bankruptcy Code.126 The franchisees in turn argued that rejection under § 365 
merely excused the bankrupt estate from any affirmative obligations and that 
their use of the mark did not fall within that category.127 This claim was 
dismissed by the court, which declared that a franchising agreement included an 
“affirmative obligation of the Debtors to allow the Franchisees to use the marks” 
and was thus excused under the Bankruptcy Code and Lubrizol.128 Because 
Congress did not affirmatively grant protection to trademark licensees, the only 
post-rejection right trademark licensees have is that of monetary damages.  
B. A (Possibly) Growing Number of Circuits Allow for Rejected Trademark 
Licensees to Retain Use of the Contracted Trademarks 
In the years following Lubrizol and the addition of § 365(n) to the 
Bankruptcy Code, Lubrizol received a significant amount of criticism, largely 
due to the decision’s over-emphasis on what constitutes an executory contract 
and an under consideration of the effect on the contract itself following 
rejection.129 Appropriately, the first case to move away from Lubrizol, In re 
 
 121 Id. at 511. 
 122 Id. at 512. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 513 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2018), 365 (2018)). 
 126 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 513. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 374-75 (“Scholars uniformly criticize Lubrizol”); see also 
Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy, 123 n.9, 130–40 (5th ed. 2010); Michael T. Andrew, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 916–19 (1988); Jay Lawrence 
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Exide Technologies, also dealt primarily with the determination of what 
constitutes an executory contract.130 The reasoning of Exide’s concurrence 
would then be picked up by the Seventh Circuit in Sunbeam Products v. Chicago 
American Manufacturing to allow trademark licensees to retain use of 
trademarks post-rejection, a decision that explicitly split the circuits.131 
1. In re Exide Technologies 
The application of the negative inference doctrine, and thus the application 
of Lubrizol, to trademarks under § 365 first took a blow with In re Exide 
Technologies.132 Before filing for chapter 11 relief, Exide sold most of its assets 
concerning the production of industrial batteries to EnerSys for $135 million.133 
Included in this contract was the perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free license 
to EnerSys to use the Exide trademark on its batteries, while Exide would retain 
the rights to the mark in its non-battery businesses.134 A decade after granting 
this perpetual license, Exide unsuccessfully attempted to regain the rights to use 
its name in the battery business from EnerSys.135 Two years after that, Exide 
declared bankruptcy and attempted again to regain its trademark, this time under 
§ 365.136 The Bankruptcy Court granted this rejection, and EnerSys appealed, 
arguing that the contract was not executory and that, even if it were, rejection of 
the contract would not terminate its rights to use the marks.137 The district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, and EnerSys again appealed.138 The 
Third Circuit reversed this decision.139 
The Third Circuit’s decision began with a discussion of what defines an 
executory contract.140 The court determined that the contract is executory if it 
“contained at least one obligation for both Exide and EnerSys that would 
constitute a material breach under New York law if not performed.”141 However, 
if one party substantially performed its obligations, then the contract is no longer 
 
Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470–72 (1997). 
 130 See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 965. 
 131 See Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377–78. 
 132 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 965. 
 133 Id. at 960. 
 134 Id. at 961. 
 135 Id.  
 136 Id.  
 137 Id.  
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at 960. 
 140 Id. at 962. 
 141 Id. 
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executory.142 The Third Circuit found that the district court had failed to assess 
the substantiality of EnerSys’ performance and reversed the decision on the basis 
that EnerSys’ payment of $135 million drastically outweighed its remaining 
obligation to maintain the quality standards of Exide’s trademark.143 
By declaring the contract non-executory, the court avoided answering 
directly whether § 365(n) applies to trademarks. The concurring opinion written 
by Judge Ambro, however, discussed directly whether the reasoning Lubrizol 
should be followed for trademarks.144 Judge Ambro first noted the history of 
Lubrizol and its role in Congress’ passing § 365(n), as well as the prevailing 
Circuit reasoning of the non-inclusion of trademarks through negative 
inference.145 Judge Ambro disagreed, however, declaring that negative inference 
“is inapt for trademark license rejections.”146 He cited the congressional 
record147 to find that Congress’ intention with regard to trademarks was to wait 
for more information before explicitly including trademarks in the definition of 
intellectual property, not a firm omission.148 He next noted that § 365 fulfills the 
goal of providing the debtor with a fresh start by “merely free[ing] the estate 
from the obligation to perform” while simultaneously having “absolutely no 
effect upon the contract’s continued existence.”149 Because the contract was 
merely breached, not destroyed, by invoking § 365, the non-breaching party 
retains the rights guaranteed to it by the contract.150 Judge Ambro ended his 
opinion arguing that: 
Courts may use § 365 to free a bankrupt trademark licensor from 
burdensome duties that hinder its reorganization. They should not—as 
occurred in this case—use it to let a licensor take back trademark rights 
it bargained away. This makes bankruptcy more a sword than a shield, 
putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they often do not deserve.151 
While merely dicta, this language would prove influential five years later. 
 
 142 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 963. 
 143 Id. at 963–64. 
 144 Id. at 965 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. at 966.  
 147 “In particular, trademark, trade name and service mark licensing relationships depend to a large extent 
on control of the quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. Since these matters could not be 
addressed without more extensive study, it was determined to postpone congressional action in this area and to 
allow the development of equitable treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.” 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 
3204. 
 148 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 149 Id. (citing Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 150 Id.; see also 2 NORTON BANKR. L. and PRAC. § 46:57 (3d ed. 2008). 
 151 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967–68 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
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2. Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC 
Judge Ambro’s dissent bloomed from dicta into legal reality when the 
Seventh Circuit in Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC 
became the first to explicitly move away from Lubrizol.152 Sunbeam arose when 
the debtor, Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., sold its trademark and 
patent rights to Sunbeam Products.153 At the time of bankruptcy these rights 
were licensed to Chicago American Manufacturing (hereinafter “CAM”).154 
When Sunbeam bought the intellectual property rights, the debtor in possession 
for the Lakewood estate opted to reject CAM’s licensing contract under § 365 
of the Bankruptcy Code.155 Despite the rejection of the contract, CAM continued 
to produce products branded with the Lakewood trademarks, arguing that its 
rights to do so were protected under § 365(n). Sunbeam filed an adversary action 
in response.156  
While the Seventh Circuit ruled that CAM was justified in continuing to use 
Lakewood’s trademarks, it did not do so by writing trademarks into the 
definition of intellectual property under the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the court 
declared that the omission of trademarks from the intellectual property definition 
simply meant that “§ 365(n) does not apply to trademarks one way or the 
other.”157 Rather, the court attacked the Lubrizol reading of § 365 as a whole, 
arguing that the earlier decision failed to accurately define what effect breach 
has upon a contract.158 While it is true that the licensee can seek damages, this 
is simply to excuse the debtor from being forced into an order of specific 
performance; the non-breaching party retains options and rights under the 
contract.159  
To illustrate the extent of the protections to be granted the non-breaching 
party under § 365, the court analogized the rejection of the trademark license to 
that of the rejection of a lease, noting that when a bankrupt landlord rejects a 
lease, the damages that result do not mandate eviction of the lessee.160 Finally 
declaring that Lubrizol “devoted scant attention to the question whether rejection 
cancels a contract,” the court created “a conflict among the circuits” and ruled 
 
 152 Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 372.  
 153 Id. at 374. 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 374–75. 
 157 Id. at 375. 
 158 Id. at 376–77. 
 159 Id. at 377. 
 160 Id. 
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that CAM could maintain its trademark rights for the remainder of the 
contractual period.161 
3. In re Tempnology, LLC 
Recently, a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“B.A.P.”) in the First Circuit 
followed Sunbeam’s lead and broke with Lubrizol.162 In re Tempnology, LLC 
concerned a dispute between the debtor, a manufacturer of cooling fabrics, and 
Mission Product Holdings, a sportswear product marketing company.163 Three 
years prior to bankruptcy, the debtor had granted an exclusive license to Mission 
to market and distribute its “Cooling Accessories” line of products within the 
United States and certain international locations.164 This license prevented the 
debtor from selling its products to any sporting goods stores domestically during 
the length of the contract, which was two years, with options to renew for one-
year terms.165 Though Mission had opted not to renew the contract after two 
years, it retained rights to the debtor’s trademarks until July 1, 2016 due to a 
contractually mandated “wind-down” period.166 Upon filing for chapter 11 relief 
on September 1, 2015, the debtor opted to reject this contract under § 365.167 
Mission objected on the grounds that § 365(n) granted it continued rights to use 
the debtor’s trademarks for the life of the contract.168 The bankruptcy court ruled 
against Mission, concluding that the contract in question dealt only with 
trademark rights, which were omitted under the Code’s definition of intellectual 
property and thus not protected.169  
On appeal, the B.A.P. agreed that § 365(n) did not apply to trademark 
licenses, but the B.A.P. held that Mission could continue to use the trademarks 
nonetheless.170 The court began its discussion noting that Lubrizol was “widely 
criticized” and that “Congress intended to overrule it” with § 365(n).171 Having 
established an air of doubt regarding the Lubrizol approach, the court 
acknowledged that trademarks are not listed as intellectual property within the 
 
 161 Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377–78. 
 162 In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. 809. This decision was appealed and reversed by the First Circuit 
in Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, No. 16-9016, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 870 (1st Cir. Jan. 
12, 2018). 
 163 In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 811. 
 164 Id.  
 165 Id. at 813. 
 166 Id.  
 167 Id.  
 168 Id. at 814. 
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. at 825. 
 171 Id. at 816 (citing 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201-02). 
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Bankruptcy Code, and thus trademark licenses are not protected under 
§ 365(n).172 The court instead adopted Sunbeam’s reasoning that Congress’s 
omission of trademarks under § 365(n) was “just an omission.”173 Furthermore, 
the court ruled that rejection “did not vaporize Mission’s rights” to retain use of 
the marks.174  
A three-judge panel of the First Circuit reversed the B.A.P.’s decision with 
regard to trademark usage rights.175 In doing so, the First Circuit noted that this 
was an issue on which other circuits were split.176 The First Circuit began its 
analysis of trademark rights post-rejection by noting that within the Bankruptcy 
Code’s definition of intellectual property “Congress expressly listed six kinds of 
intellectual property,” including relatively obscure intellectual properties such 
as “mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17,” but did not include 
trademarks.177 Trademark licenses, the court noted with no small amount of 
incredulity, are “hardly something one would forget about.”178 Thus, the court 
reasoned that Congress actively did not want trademark licenses protected under 
§ 365(n).179 The court then turned its attention to what, if any, protections can 
be found within § 365 as a whole.180 
The First Circuit directly responded to the Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam 
decision throughout its decision.181 It began by noting that Congress left open 
the question of trademarks in order to “allow the development of equitable 
treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.”182 The court then applauded 
the Seventh Circuit’s restraint in having “resisted the temptation to find in this 
ambiguous comment outside the statutory text a toehold for unfettered 
‘equitable’ dispensations.”183 Having dismissed the possibility of reading 
Congress’s silence on trademarks as a blank check, the court’s focus shifted to 
 
 172 In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 820–21. 
 173 Id. at 820. 
 174 Id. at 822. 
 175 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d 389. 
 176 Id. at 392. 
 177 Id. at 401; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). 
 178 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 401. 
 179 Id.  
 180 Id. (The court makes one particularly interesting counter example to another First Circuit case in which 
it was held that “a counterparty’s right to compel the return of its own property survives rejection of a contract 
under which the debtor has possession of that property.”) Though this example is not a direct analogue, it will 
be worth returning to later in this Comment. 
 181 Id. at 401–05. 
 182 Id. at 401 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 6).  
 183 Id.  
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Sunbeam’s analysis of the practical effects of rejection under § 365(g).184 The 
First Circuit paid especial attention to the lack of “vaporizing” of contractual 
rights of the non-breaching party described in both Sunbeam and the B.A.P.’s 
Tempnology review.185 Though the court agreed that these rights are not 
“vaporized,” it argued that those rights should be best expressed as monetary 
damages, not the ability to continue to use the trademarks.186 
The court noted that Congress’s goal in allowing for the rejection of 
executory contracts “was to ‘release the debtor’s estate from burdensome 
obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.’”187 This is best served 
through monetary damages.188 With this freeing of the debtor from contractual 
obligations in mind, the court argued that Sunbeam, as well as Judge Ambro’s 
concurrence in Exide, are built “on the unstated premise that it is possible to free 
a debtor from any continuing performance obligations under a trademark license 
even while preserving the licensee’s right to use the trademark.”189 This premise, 
however, is impossible due to the nature of trademark licensing law.190 
The First Circuit next analyzed exactly why allowing trademark licensees to 
continue using licensed trademarks without any obligation from the licensor 
debtor flies in the face of trademark license law.191 In order for a trademark 
license to be effective, the trademark owner must monitor and exercise control 
over the quality of the goods sold to the public under cover of the trademark.”192 
To do otherwise would open the possibility of the trademark no longer fulfilling 
its role as a “signal of uniform quality” to the public, and thus open the mark to 
the threat of abandonment through naked licensing.193 The approach of the 
Seventh Circuit would therefore “force Debtor to choose between performing 
executory obligations arising from the continuance of the license or risking the 
permanent loss of its trademarks.”194 This essentially turns rejection under § 365 
into an ultimatum: take advantage of § 365 and risk losing your trademark, or 
continue to perform under the contract and essentially act as if no rejection had 
 
 184 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402. 
 185 Id. at 402; see Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 377; In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 822-23. 
 186 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402. 
 187 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984)). 
 188 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402. 
 189 Id. (citing Sunbeam Products, Inc., 686 F.3d at 378; In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967 (Ambro, J., 
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ever taken place.195 Thus, Sunbeam entirely ignored the residual enforcement 
burden it would impose on the debtor just as the Code otherwise allows the 
debtor to free itself from executory burdens, and therefore stretched the 
interpretation of § 365 larger than both its text and congressional intent will 
allow.196 
The majority, preempting the dissent’s biggest concern, argued against 
reading too deeply into the congressional record cited in Exide and Sunbeam. 
The court felt this approach gives too great an emphasis on “a few lines in the 
Senate Report” over the text of the statute itself.197 The court argued that in other 
portions of § 365 exceptions are explicitly written into the statute when 
“Congress otherwise intended to grant bankruptcy courts the ability to 
‘equitably’ craft exceptions to the Code’s rules.”198 To hold otherwise would 
force courts to make “case specific, equitable” decisions not clearly supported 
by the text of the Bankruptcy Code.199 
The court ended its analysis by noting that, even if it were to employ a “case-
specific, equitable approach,” it would hesitate to do so, as the most likely 
instance in which courts would rule in favor of allowing a licensee to continue 
to use a trademark would be one in which the licensing agreement had the least 
built-in quality controls.200 In those cases, the debtor-licensor would thus have 
few, if any, obligations post-rejection and not face an undue burden.201 This lack 
of burden, however, would carry with it a drastically increased risk of naked 
licensing, one made all the more potent by the “adversarial relationship” of the 
two entities post-bankruptcy litigation.202 In addition, the process of determining 
the most equitable solution would “sadl[e] bankruptcy proceedings with the 
added cost and delay of attempting to draw fact-sensitive and unreliable 
distinctions between greater and lesser burdens.”203 As such, the majority 
“favor[s] the categorical approach of leaving trademark licenses unprotected 
 
 195 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 403. 
 196 Id. at 404. 
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from court-approved rejection, unless and until Congress should decide 
otherwise.”204 
In dissent, Judge Torruella argued that the First Circuit went too far in 
reading Congress’s omission of trademark licenses from § 365(n) to mean that 
the licenses are unprotected under § 365 as a whole.205 Instead, he argued that 
the First, in creating a “bright-line rule that the omission of trademarks . . . leaves 
a non-rejecting party without any remaining rights to use a debtor’s trademark 
and logo” flies in the face of congressional intent.206 Citing the piece of the 
Senate committee report used by Exide, Sunbeam, and the B.A.P., Judge 
Torruella argued that the intention of Congress was not to omit trademarks but 
instead to leave the question of trademark licenses the courts “to allow the 
development of equitable treatment.”207 Judge Torruella argued in turn that the 
First Circuit overestimated how much work decisions like Sunbeam do.208 
Instead of inventing special rights for licensees, these courts are merely allowing 
the respective parties’ post-rejection rights to be governed by applicable non-
bankruptcy law.209 Finally, Judge Torruella found that the majority’s concern 
over the burden of quality control placed on rejecting licensors, though 
admirable, could be easily “enforced through further legal action and the 
equitable remedy of specific performance” in a way that would not put an undue 
burden on the debtor.210 
The First Circuit’s decision in Tempnology marks the first trademark license 
case on the circuit level since Sunbeam, and as such it draws a line in the sand. 
The approach of the Seventh Circuit will not be slowly adopted by the other 
circuits over time. Instead, the circuits will remain split until Congress revisits 
the issue or the courts adopt a third, better approach. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Neither side of the current split offers a perfect solution to treatment of the 
rejection of trademark licenses under § 365, and the split itself adds further 
 
 204 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 405 (citing James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, Trademark 
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uncertainty.211 Meanwhile, the rigid application of either approach comes with 
undesired side-effects. Since the Sunbeam decision, legal observers have largely 
fallen into two camps: those holding that Lubrizol’s reasoning should control for 
trademarks,212 and those following the reasoning of Sunbeam allowing the 
licensee to continue to use trademarks.213 Both, however, fail to take into 
account the vast differences possible amongst trademark licensing agreements, 
and thus fail to allow a court to assess any given license on its own terms. 
Instead, courts should take a more holistic approach in order to prevent the 
Bankruptcy Code from taking trademark rights from the entity that contributed 
most to the trademark’s goodwill with the public, whether it be the licensee or 
licensor.  
A. Circuits Following Sunbeam Undervalue the Nature of Trademarks 
The circuits which grant licensees continued use of trademark rights 
following rejection consistently underestimate the unique properties of 
trademarks, specifically the risk that comes from abandonment of the mark 
through naked licensing. The Third Circuit dodged applying § 365 in Exide by 
ruling that the contract in question was not executory, because the money paid 
by the licensee was enough to outweigh the licensee’s continuing obligation to 
maintain quality controls.214 This unfairly trivializes the importance of 
maintaining quality control over a mark to prevent naked licensing and raises 
numerous needless questions and confusions as to the nature of licensing 
contracts.215 Because failing to maintain quality over goods produced under a 
licensed trademark has the potential to render the trademark valueless, the 
burden to maintain quality should always be weighty enough to be deemed a 
performance due by the licensee during the life of the contract. 
Even when the courts acknowledge the executory nature of trademark 
licenses, they have failed to take into account the risks inherent in allowing 
licensees to continue to use the marks following rejection: the threat of naked 
licensing. The analogy to leasehold interests used in Sunbeam to reject Lubrizol 
is indicative of this failure.216 If a landlord rejects a lease under § 365, the tenant 
 
 211 Crystal Lawson, JD Candidate, Whether Rejection of a Trademark License Agreement Terminates the 
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 214 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 964. 
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has the option to remain. This simply prolongs the time before the landlord can 
re-lease the property, with the risks of losing the opportunity for the most 
lucrative new lease and potential depreciation of the property’s value.217 If a 
trademark owner is unable to provide adequate control over the licensed mark, 
the risk is the complete loss of the mark for all parties involved. Judge 
Easterbrook, who authored both the Sunbeam and Eva’s Bridal decisions one 
year apart, should have been especially aware of this risk.218  
Even if protection of the trademark could be assured, the fact remains that 
not every licensee deserves the same usage rights. In Exide, the license in 
question had been going on for over twelve years.219 In Sunbeam, the license 
had only existed for less than half a year.220 The levels buy-in between these two 
cases are drastically different. To treat them the same would not be equitable. 
There are, of course, benefits to circuits following in the footsteps of the 
Sunbeam precedent. Trademark owners in financial risk, but not yet in need of 
seeking bankruptcy relief, are more likely to profitably find partners willing to 
license their trademarks despite the cloud of financial trouble. More 
significantly, in instances in which a licensee has contributed significantly to the 
goodwill and trust in the mark in the minds of the public, that trust is not put into 
jeopardy by bankruptcy suddenly stripping the license. 
However, these benefits pale in comparison to the greater threat of the 
license falling into naked licensing territory, risking the abandonment of the 
mark and thus the complete loss of the property value to all involved. This risk 
of lost value spills out to not just the licensor and licensee, but also the entire 
creditor pool. This greater threat requires greater protection. More importantly, 
the instances in which a licensee has contributed significantly to the goodwill of 
the trademark, in comparison to the licensor, are likely very few. To grant a 
licensee of six months the same protection as a licensee of twelve years serves 
neither the goals of bankruptcy nor the aims of trademark protections. 
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B. Circuits Which Do Not Allow Licensees to Retain Use Better Respect 
Trademarks but Are Too Rigid 
The courts which do not follow Sunbeam take Congress’ decision not to 
include trademarks within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual 
property as reason not to grant usage to licensees post-rejection. This approach 
better protects trademarks in the vast majority of cases. However, this approach 
is also too broad and likely comes less from deference to Congress and more 
from an unwillingness to decide on the merits of a case. It also poses economic 
risks of its own. 
Of the two approaches taken by the courts, this is the approach least likely 
to risk the trademarks in question.221 Because licenses rejected under this 
approach can no longer be used by the licensee, there is no risk of uncontrolled 
use. This means there is no risk of naked licensing, obviating the biggest threat 
to the trademark itself. 
This strict reading is not without tradeoffs of its own. Jurisdictions which 
hold that trademark usage by the licensee must end following rejection risk a 
chilling effect on the ability of financially unstable businesses to license 
trademarks. It is not inconceivable that a cash-poor business with strong 
trademarks could be able to license out those marks to other entities which have 
the resources necessary to produce or products the mark owner simply could not 
afford to, providing the revenue necessary to keep the business afloat. If, 
however, the would-be licensee knows that at any moment the mark owner could 
declare bankruptcy and revoke the trademark license, then the ability of the 
trademark licensor to successfully license its mark in a way to stave off 
bankruptcy is drastically reduced. 
Once a trademark licensor in such a jurisdiction enters bankruptcy, however, 
the greater control exercised by trademark holders could better allow for 
financial return on the mark as contemplated by § 365. If a debtor can regain its 
trademark rights, the debtor is in turn able to either use the marks for its own 
economic purposes or sell them off at a higher rate of return than would be 
possible if the current license were allowed to stand. 
In some instances, however, the licensee has contributed to the value of the 
trademark so significantly that the public views it, as much or more than the 
licensor, as the provider of the goods in question. In these cases, such a strict 
reading does not serve justice. For the licensee, a significant component of its 
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business is stripped away for a sum of money that cannot truly compensate for 
that loss. For the fellow creditors, the value of the breached contract will likely 
be so much as to overwhelm many smaller debts. And most importantly, for the 
public at large, the goods the trademark had come to represent will no longer 
mean what it once did. 
Meanwhile, this reading of the statute as exclusively negating the ability of 
a trademark licensee to continue use of marks, regardless of circumstances, is 
too strong for mere negative inference to bear. While the canon of negative 
inference is well established within statutory interpretation,222 in this instance 
Congress’s intent is hardly murky. It could be argued that perhaps the act of 
inferring congressional intent over the plain language of the statute is beyond 
the scope of a judge’s purview. 
C. The Glaring Issue 
Because Congress’s silence on the matter is likely to continue into the 
indefinite future,223 the circuit split necessarily creates uncertainty within all 
trademark licensing agreements. Meanwhile, problems inevitably arise with 
both approaches. 
Two truths exist simultaneously at the heart of this circuit split. First, 
decisions such as Sunbeam failed to go far enough to protect the marks in dispute 
from risks such as naked licensing while potentially hampering the ability of 
trademark owners to properly restructure. Second, some instances exist in which 
the rigidity of the Lubrizol approach for trademarks would be inequitable. No 
two trademark licenses are created equal. Treating a thirty-year exclusive license 
of a brand built in part from the sweat of the licensee the same as a one-year, 
non-exclusive license that has yet to use the brand in commerce is not equitable. 
As such, courts faced with trademark rejection under § 365 should weigh a series 
of factors to determine the most equitable result for the licensor and licensee, as 
well as the creditors of the estate. These factors should be designed to protect 
the mark itself, which in turn protects value in the estate and consumers at large. 
The facts of Exide provide an excellent illustration of this problem. Consider 
the following counterfactual: all of the facts of Exide, with the sole exception 
that instead of having paid for its license in one initial lump sum, EnerSys’s 
agreement with Exide had been a perpetual, exclusive license that EnerSys paid 
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for with annual lease payments.224 This structure of contract would almost 
certainly have to be seen as executory225 and thus require a § 365 analysis.  
EnerSys held the license to produce batteries under the Exide name for 
twelve years before Exide’s bankruptcy.226 During this time, each Exide battery 
the consuming public bought developed a relationship not only with EnerSys-
produced batteries but also with the Exide brand as a whole. Thus, a symbiotic 
relationship formed. EnerSys produced batteries of a consistent quality under an 
established name. Exide received both regular payments for that right and the 
added value and goodwill to their brand in the eyes of the public that EnerSys 
contributed. Most importantly, the public came to expect a consistent standard 
of quality that came from EnerSys’s Exide batteries.  
For a court to allow the Bankruptcy Code to sever this relationship would be 
injustice, not only to EnerSys, but to the public at large who have come to view 
EnerSys as the source of Exide batteries. On the other hand, to grant the same 
opportunity to continue to use trademarks under license to an entity that has held 
a non-exclusive license for only a year would be similarly unjust to the 
trademark owner, both because of the lack of built goodwill and the risk of naked 
licensing.  
D. Balancing of Interests 
The overriding maxim that courts should use to square this circle when 
determining trademark decisions under § 365 is that protection of the mark itself 
is of paramount importance. To hold otherwise risks destroying a significant 
asset which could be used by the debtor to regain a fresh financial footing and 
to pay off would be creditors. Meanwhile, the courts should attempt to apply the 
consumer protections of trademark law whenever possible to best protect society 
as a whole. 
By allowing rejection of an executory contract, courts have already admitted 
that the debtor has acted in good faith.227 Courts should not ignore, however, 
that a licensee’s use of the mark following rejection has to potential to help the 
debtor in the long run. The continued availability of trademarked goods or 
services despite the debtor’s financial troubles through the licensee could have 
 
 224 See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61. 
 225 Even the Third Circuit would have likely seen the contract to be executory. See In re Exide Techs., 607 
F.3d at 964. 
 226 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61. 
 227 See In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. at 430-31; see also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 523. 
SMITH COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:25 AM 
296 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
a positive effect on the longevity of the mark, providing a foundation of goodwill 
the debtor could draw from post-bankruptcy. The possibility also exists that the 
licensee’s use of the mark could contribute to the overall health of the brand in 
other ways: for instance, keeping the mark in commerce during the tumultuous 
bankruptcy process, thus preventing the mark from entering abandonment.228 
That being said, if the courts grant the licensee the ability to continue to use 
the mark in question, there must be some mechanism in place to prevent the 
trademark use to devolve into naked licensing. One could argue that the 
licensee’s interest in using the trademark is sufficient to trust it to maintain the 
mark; however, this likely takes too charitable a view of human interactions. 
Having gone through the rejection of a licensing contract and the resulting court 
actions, very little imagination is required to foresee vindictive licensees saving 
money on quality control to maximize profits for as long as the now-rejected 
trademark rights allow. Thus, courts will need use their equitable powers to 
mandate maintenance of quality of products produced under the mark in order 
to prevent the loss of the mark through abandonment. 
Keeping in mind that the proceedings in question are bankruptcy 
proceedings, courts should first and foremost consider the value adjustment the 
results of their decisions will have on the estate in bankruptcy. Because rejection 
of a contract under § 365 is subject to a business judgment standard,229 if courts 
rule that rejection is allowed, the licensor should have a prima facie assumption 
of regaining its rights. A licensee’s continued use of a trademark following 
rejection could have a series of adverse effects on the value of the estate. The 
debtor might be less able to restructure its business post-bankruptcy. Should the 
debtor choose to sell its trademark rights entirely, whether through liquidation 
or as part of restructuring, the selling price might be substantially less if the new 
buyer cannot be guaranteed exclusive rights to the mark. This has the potential 
to lower the amount available to repay creditors.  
On the other hand, the larger the licensing contract, the larger the cost 
breaching will add to the unsecure creditor pool. Moreover, even if retention of 
the trademark through rejection adds a significant value to the estate, other 
factors might be sufficient to outweigh this value and demand that the licensee 
retain use of the license. 
 
 228 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); GILSON, supra note 72. 
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SMITH COMMENT_PROOFS 1/14/2019 9:25 AM 
2019] IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S US 297 
E. Proposed Solutions 
Any equitable solution must rectify the problems created by each side of the 
circuit split: the lack of protection for trademark assets created by Sunbeam, and 
the overly strict bright-line of the majority of circuits. 
Congress’s potential answer is the Innovation Act.230 The act seeks to 
remedy this situation by explicitly adding trademarks to the § 101(35A) 
definition, while also creating a statutory requirement that if a licensee elects to 
retain the trademark rights following rejection, the licensee must both maintain 
the quality of services offered under the mark and enforce quality control for 
those products.231 This solves the confusion as to definition currently dividing 
the circuits, as well as the open risk of naked licensing-caused trademark 
abandonment under the Sunbeam precedent. However, there is also the risk that 
a one-size-fits-all approach to an issue as uniquely complex as trademark 
licensing might cause more ill than good.  
Most notably, this approach by Congress would essentially set into stone the 
Sunbeam approach, while taking steps to remove the risk of naked licensing. 
This fails to take the goals of bankruptcy and trademark law, and the basic justice 
they represent, into full account. An ideal law would allow the debtor the best 
possible chance to restructure in such a way as to become economically viable 
and productive once again. If the debtor is unable to regain full control over an 
exclusive license, for instance, then significant potential areas of restructuring 
are off the table from the start. If the license in question had only been in place 
a short period of time, before the licensee could establish itself as the provider 
of the licensed products in the minds of the public, then trademark law would 
offer no policy justification for allowing this level of hindrance to the debtor’s 
restructuring. 
This is likely a moot concern from a practical standpoint. Due to a host of 
changes the act also makes to patent law, the act is currently bogged down in 
legislative limbo, unlikely to emerge any time soon.232 If the current state of 
affairs is to change, it will likely have to do so in the courts. 
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F. The Factor Test 
In order to serve the goal of protecting a licensed trademark, courts should 
seek to determine which entity has to this point developed the goodwill 
relationship with the public upon which the trademark is built, while 
simultaneously protecting the mark from the existential threat of naked 
licensing. The two factors which best represent this building of a relationship 
are time and exclusivity. A licensee cannot build goodwill with consumers 
without having served them for some length of time. Meanwhile, a licensee who 
is the exclusive purveyor of goods under a name to the public is more likely to 
have developed a relationship worth protecting. 
These two factors are of value because they cut both ways, depending upon 
the facts of an individual case. While the length and exclusivity of a licensing 
agreement can be obstacles to the estate’s retaining value and the possibility of 
a fresh start, they can also speak to a certain level of buy-in by a licensee. 
Notably, a licensee’s commercial use can help to increase the value of a brand.233 
In instances in which the licensee, perhaps under a long-term exclusive license, 
used the licensor’s trademark in commerce in such a way as to significantly 
contribute to the public’s goodwill toward the brand, that licensee’s rights of use 
should be weighed accordingly. 
This is not to say that these factors will favor licensors and licensees each 
roughly half the time. The facts of most cases will likely come down in favor of 
licensors. This is appropriate, as in the vast majority of cases, a licensor bears 
vastly more responsibility for the goodwill of the public than any individual 
licensee. However, this factor test is useful precisely because of the few cases in 
which it will rescue those licensees that have built significant equity in a brand 
from the starkness of a bright-line rule. It would be inequitable to deprive a 
licensee of use of a mark when the licensee bears responsibility for the marks 
growth and value. These factors provide a solution not only for the good of 
individuals on either side of a licensing agreement, but for the public at large, 
which has built a relationship with the brands in question. 
1. How Long was the Licensing Agreement in Place before Bankruptcy? 
In order to ensure that the entity which most contributed to the goodwill of 
the trademark retains use of the mark, a court should first assess how long the 
licensee used the mark pre-bankruptcy. Trademarks are, at their core, reflections 
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of a relationship between a commercial entity and its consumers. This is why 
use in commerce is an essential component of any form of trademark 
protection.234 A licensee could not have built a meaningful connection to and 
relationship with consumers without some significant period of pre-petition use. 
How long, then, must a licensee have used a trademark in order to have 
contributed to the mark in a significant way? Unfortunately, there is no bright-
line rule that could or should be drawn to show when a product has been in the 
market long enough to develop a relationship. One potential guideline may be 
the Lanham Act, which offers time frames for both incontestability and 
abandonment of marks.235 Practically speaking, however, courts should assess 
factual indicators of the licensee’s relationship with consumers. Items such as 
number of years producing the product, percentage of the trademark’s market 
share created by the licensee, and consumer survey data should all be taken into 
account in order to determine whether the license has been in place long enough 
to have the necessary effect. 
A licensee needs time in order to develop a significant measure of goodwill 
with the general public. Without that time, and the subsequent goodwill and 
association, a licensee should not be allowed to maintain use of a mark. Time 
alone, however, merely provides the opportunity for this goodwill and must be 
viewed in conjunction with the next factor. 
2. Is the License Exclusive? 
Courts should next consider whether and to what extent the license is 
exclusive. The exclusivity of a license is important for two reasons: it offers 
insight into the potential for the relationship a licensee has built with its 
consumers, as well as for threatening the debtor-licensor’s ability to gain a fresh 
start.  
If a license is exclusive, whether in terms of product line or geography, the 
licensee is drastically more able to develop a source-provider relationship with 
the public. If a licensee is the sole provider of a specific type good or service, 
even if another entity provides different goods or services under the same mark, 
then for that specific good or service consumers are likely to consider the 
licensee the source. This is equally true if the licensee is the sole user of a mark 
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within a given region. On the other hand, if a license is non-exclusive, then the 
licensee is almost certainly not going to be seen as a source provider by the 
public. 
A non-exclusive license holds much less risk of diminished value to the 
estate. On the other hand, an exclusive license could lead to instances in which 
the licensor, in its attempt to reorganize post-bankruptcy, might be prevented 
from using its own name in the region or area of commerce in which it seeks to 
operate.236 This set of circumstances should be avoided generally. However, in 
instances where some measure of exclusivity has led to the licensee’s 
contributing a significant amount of goodwill to a brand, courts should rule this 
factor in favor of the licensee. 
Thus, exclusivity is a near requisite for a court to rule that a licensee should 
be allowed to maintain use of a mark following rejection. This requisite is not 
sufficient, however; the significant period of pre-petition use of the mark of the 
previous factor must be co-requisite. 
3. What is the Risk of Naked Licensing? 
Given the risk of abandonment posed by naked licensing, courts should 
always take its potential into account when determining who may or may not 
use the marks. After all, if a trademark is abandoned, there is nothing left to 
protect. When assessing this point, a court might take into account the amount 
of buy-in from the licensee. A licensee that has built much of its own business 
around the strength of a mark is unlikely to risk the destruction of the mark in 
order to cut cost or quality. On the other hand, a non-exclusive licensee with 
little investment in the name might be more than willing to save money on 
quality control in order to recoup the costs of an expensive bankruptcy litigation, 
leaving the mark significantly more at risk. 
The liquidity and financial health of the licensee should also be considered. 
A licensee with clean bill of financial health is much less likely to cut corners 
with quality than one on the brink of bankruptcy itself. Given that rejection under 
§ 365 and subsequent litigation will likely leave the licensee with no goodwill 
between itself and the debtor, an additional financial incentive to produce goods 
or services of inconsistent quality should not be allowed. 
 
 236 See In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. at 509. 
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G. The Factor Test in Practice 
These three factors ideally serve to protect the value of a trademark. The 
length of use of a trademark and the exclusivity of that use combine to provide 
a strong estimation of how likely the general public is to view an entity as the 
source of goods denoted by that trademark. Meanwhile, assessing for the 
potential of naked licensing mitigates the risk posed by the court’s decision. 
These factors, however, must be tested with fact patterns in order to demonstrate 
that they are capable of achieving just results. In this section, I will run the 
factors through three fact patterns: first a hypothetical bankruptcy of 
McDonald’s, then the facts of Tempnology, and finally a modified version of the 
facts of Exide. Having done so, the flexibility and efficacy of the test will be 
more apparent.  
1. Hypothetical McDonald’s Bankruptcy 
With the factor test in mind, I return to the question posed at the beginning 
of this Comment: what is the most equitable solution should a corporation like 
McDonald’s go bankrupt? Given the strength of the corporation’s brand,237 this 
sort of hypothetical is important, as no factor test would be of any value if it had 
the potential to drastically disrupt a cornerstone of the worldwide economy. For 
the purposes of this hypothetical, I will assume that the court is dealing with the 
rejection of the executory contract which allows an individual franchisee to use 
McDonald’s trademarks.  
First, the court would look to how long the individual franchise had been in 
existence. The oldest McDonald’s franchise still in existence opened in 1953.238 
This means that, for a few franchises anyhow, multiple generations of consumers 
have come to develop a relationship with that individual store. A franchisee has 
an indefinite length of contract, allowing it to continue to use the trademark 
rights so long as the provisions of the contract are met, giving the option of this 
relationship to continue long into the future.239 Some franchises thus have a 
 
 237 McDonald’s brand is currently valued at $97.72 billion. Millward Brown, 10 most valuable North 
American brands in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/259061/10-
most-valuable-north-american-brands/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).  
 238 Adam Chandler, The Owner of the Oldest McDonald’s on the Minimum Wage, THE ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/09/heres-what-the-owner-of-the-oldest-operating-
mcdonalds-has-to-say-about-minimum-wage/379624/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 239 McDonald’s, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/ 
mcdonalds/282570# (last visited Nov. 14, 2017); Acquiring a Franchise, MCDONALDS.COM, http://corporate. 
mcdonalds.com/mcd/franchising/us_franchising/acquiring_a_franchise.html.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).  
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legitimate argument as to having contributed to the brand for a significant period 
of time.  
Time alone is not enough to have contributed to a brand. In order for a 
franchisee to have developed enough of a relationship with the consuming public 
for a consumer to reasonably expect the wares to come from that particular 
franchisee, exclusivity must come into play. An individual franchise by its 
nature is not exclusive. There are over 14,000 McDonald’s franchises in the 
United States alone.240 The average franchisee owns six franchises, often in the 
same geographic region.241 It is simply not feasible to assume that any consumer, 
even in a region dominated by one franchisee, buys a Big Mac and assumes that 
Big Mac came from the franchisee specifically, not McDonald’s at large. This 
lack of exclusivity makes it unlikely any individual franchisee could develop a 
source-provider relationship with its consumers. 
If a significant number of now-former franchisees are allowed to use 
McDonald’s trademarks following rejection, stores across the country would 
operate under the McDonald’s name without the draconian hand of the 
McDonald’s corporation mandating quality and consistency. Given that so much 
of McDonald’s value comes from the ability of consumers from across the 
country to know that the food will be essentially the same at any store they visit, 
this possibility is ruinous and unacceptable to McDonald’s. 
Franchises are a symbiotic relationship. A franchisee’s successful execution 
of the franchise builds goodwill for the entire brand in the mind of its customers. 
At the same time, the franchisee chooses to enter into the franchising agreement 
in order to trade upon the goodwill which already exists for the brand in the mind 
of consumers. In the case of McDonald’s, the time has passed when any given 
franchisee could lay claim to having built a significant portion of the 
McDonald’s trademark’s goodwill. 
Thus, McDonald’s would be allowed to reject its franchising agreements 
under § 365 in order to undergo a potentially drastic reduction of its stores in 
order to rehabilitate its brand. This is the proper result from a public policy 
perspective. As unfortunate as losing a business is for an individual franchisee, 
the relative good McDonald’s has brought to the country and world as a whole 
 
 240 Number of McDonald’s restaurants in North America, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
256040/mcdonalds-restaurants-in-north-america/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 241 Bryan Gruley & Leslie Patton, McRevolt: The Frustrating Life of the McDonald’s Franchisee, 
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 16, 2015) https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-mcdonalds-franchises/ (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2018). 
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is orders of magnitudes greater. As such, the ideal legal result should err on the 
side of McDonald’s eventual rehabilitation.  
2. In re Tempnology, Revisited 
Having seen the factor test applied to the hypothetical bankruptcy of a fast 
food giant, I will now apply it to an actual case: Tempnology. When applied, the 
factors will produce the same just result as the First Circuit without drawing the 
needlessly strict bright-line. 
First, the court would assess how long the licensee operated under the 
trademark license before its termination. Mission Products held a license to the 
trademarks in question for slightly under three years before the bankruptcy 
proceedings.242 This is a relatively short period of time, especially when one 
factors in the ramp-up period it took before Mission could put the trademarks 
into use. As such, it is unlikely that many, if any, consumers had the opportunity 
to come to know Mission as the source of the products in question. 
This likelihood is lessened further when factoring in the license’s non-
exclusivity.243 This means that consumers neither in a given region nor of a 
specific product line came to view Mission as the sole source of the products in 
question. There is no reason to believe that Mission developed a source-provider 
relationship with the public worth protecting. 
Finally, the potential risk of abandonment through naked licensing is far too 
great to allow Mission to continue to use the marks, while the benefit to the 
public of allowing Mission to use the marks is negligible if it exists at all. As 
such, monetary damages for breach are more than sufficient remedies for 
Mission under § 365. 
3. The Exide Counterfactual 
Finally, I return to the counterfactual version of Exide mentioned earlier in 
the Comment, in which the facts of the case are the same with the exception of 
a payment structure that makes the contract inarguably executory. Here, the 
factors will produce an equitable result that favors the licensee. 
The court would first assess how long EnerSys licensed the Exide name to 
produce batteries: twelve years.244 Twelve years is a significant period of time, 
 
 242 In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. at 811. 
 243 Id. 
 244 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61. 
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especially in a technology sector. That was over a decade of time in which Exide-
branded batteries meant batteries produced by EnerSys. Given that the Lanham 
Act requires only three years of non-use for a mark to be presumed abandoned, 
this is likely enough time to form a goodwill relationship with the public.245 
While there is enough time involved, time alone is not enough for a licensee 
to establish a claim to the goodwill of a brand sufficient to warrant the courts’ 
allowing trademark use to continue post-petition. To establish this, the court 
should next look to exclusivity. EnerSys operated as the exclusive producer of 
Exide-branded batteries over the twelve years of its license.246 For over a decade, 
any battery bought by the public with Exide on the label was produced by 
EnerSys. Meanwhile, Exide itself produced no batteries during this time 
period.247 Thus, for the period in question, EnerSys practically speaking was 
Exide for batteries.  
This is an incredibly compelling argument for allowing EnerSys to continue 
using the Exide trademark. However, the court must assess the risk of naked 
licensing before allowing EnerSys to continue to use the name. After all, should 
Exide be found to have nakedly licensed its name, then the brand risks losing its 
protectable mark for all who use it.248 The licensing agreement Exide signed 
with EnerSys had clear quality control standards.249 The combination of the 
contractual obligation to maintain a standard and the buy-in EnerSys showed 
over the twelve years of exclusive production are likely enough to make any risk 
of naked licensing minimal. 
Thus, the most just course of action for both EnerSys and the consuming 
public which has come to associate EnerSys-produced batteries with the Exide 
name is to allow EnerSys to continue to use the trademarks under the license. 
CONCLUSION 
Trademark law exists to protect the relationship between the source of a 
product or service and its consumers. Happily, the Bankruptcy Code can be used 
by courts to serve this purpose as well, while also protecting the value of the 
estate. Unfortunately, both sides of the current circuit split are not using the full 
power they wield as courts of equity to achieve these goals.  
 
 245 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (This is presumably evidence of Congress’s perspective on how fast 
perspective changes in our economic lives). 
 246 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 960–61. 
 247 Id. 
 248 See Eva’s Bridal, Ltd., 639 F.3d 788. 
 249 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 963. 
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The factor test outlined in this Comment offers one possible way bankruptcy 
courts could change that. Decisions like Sunbeam leave trademarks at risk of 
naked licensing, and they overvalue the status of short-term licensees. While the 
bright-line rule of decisions like Tempnology rightfully weigh the importance of 
protecting trademarks and thus consumers, they run the risk of injuring those 
customers through a lack of flexibility. In instances like counter-Exide, courts 
following that precedent would be violating the principle of consumer 
protection, as there is a real likelihood that the name “Exide” will no longer 
mean in fact what it does in the minds of the paying customer. Thus, in order to 
maintain the consumer protections inherent in trademark law, some level of 
trademark producer continuity is necessary. This is best achieved through a more 
fact specific and less bright-line approach such as the factor test outlined above. 
From Exide to Sunbeam to Tempnology, the past decade alone has seen a 
dramatic increase in the number of circuit court cases dealing with trademark 
licensing agreements in bankruptcy. This trend is unlikely to change until 
Congress or the Supreme Court weighs in on the matter.250 When a solution 
finally comes, let us hope that it weighs the aspects of consumer protection 
inherent in trademark law in determining the most equitable result of the 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
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